Population Census DRC

Jaynet Kabila, sister of the President and Member of Parliament put Prime Minister Matata on the spot last week. She raised the question in Parliament how the government plans on implementing its social and development objectives without knowing how many people live in the country. Matata’s five-year plan outlines six objectives. Deputy Kabila (representing Kalemie in Katanga) called for a comprehensive population census to be added as a seventh objective. Her question and recommendation obviously make sense.

It is assumed that Congo’s population is 67.8 million, that there is a 2.6% growth rate and an urban population of 35%. But these figures published by the United Nations Population Fund (UNPF) are ‘guesstimates’. The last population census in DRC dates back to 1984 so no one really knows.

What has been the impact of HIV/AIDS? The two Congo wars (1996-1997 and 1998-2003) are reported to have resulted in an estimated 5.4 million ‘excess deaths’ according to the International Rescue Committee. How accurate are these casualty counts? Again we simply do not know.

A major obstacle to free and fair elections is the absence of reliable demographic data. According to demographer Léon de Saint Moulin, Kinshasa’s population was 9.7 million in 2010 whereas the CIA World Factbook placed it at 8.4 million (2011). When it comes to voter registration and constituency forming in a hotly contested arena like that of Kinshasa, this discrepancy is not trivial. 

The census is long overdue. The UN recommends that population counts be done every 10 years. Again, according to the UNPF, DRC is the only African country to have not carried out a census in the past 20 years. In post-conflict situations, efficient development, security and infrastructure planning depend on realistic population data. The data is fundamental for private sector investors and the land use planners who need to establish where to build schools, hospitals, roads, water pumping stations, electricity grids and government builds.

Census data is by its very nature sensitive: how many people live under a roof, age, sex, level of education, in some cases biometric information, etc. A reliable census is consequently based on trust. There is no guarantee that the necessary degree of trust between government and citizen currently exists in Congo to gather such comprehensive data.

The cost of a census in DRC is estimated at $173 million.

The United Nations Population Fund jointly with other UN agencies is supporting the Government of DRC in conducting a Population and Housing Census (PHC) planned for 2014. The fund's strategy is to enable national technical and management capacities in DRC to plan and implement high quality census taking. Another UN agency, UNOPS, is building regional offices to house the census work. Results of this census could be used for development planning, good governance and poverty alleviation.

Carrying out this population census is a major priority. Without reliable data, development planning will remain arbitrary, politically biased and ad hoc.

Matata's Five-Year Plan

Prime Minister Matata Mapon presented his five-year Programme d’Action du Gouvernement: 2012-2016 to the Congolese National Assembly last week.

Building on President Kabila’s new mantra ‘revolution and modernity’ the programme outlines six ambitious objectives: (i) institutional reform and reinforcing the efficiency of the state, (ii) consolidating macroeconomic stability, accelerating growth and creating jobs, (iii) improving and developing infrastructure, (iv) improving living conditions for the population, (v) stimulating a sense of civism and (vi) improving Congo’s international relations and image.

The programme stipulates – but only in very general terms – how the realization of these objectives is to be financed. Three sources of funding are emphasized: (i) national fiscal revenues, (ii) public-private partnerships and (iii) support from bi- and multinational partners.

The 57-page document provides for very interesting reading. There are examples of critical realism: “L’économie congolaise a enregistré durant la décade 2000-2010 un taux de croissance moyen de 5%. Cette performance ne s’est malheureusement pas traduite par une amélioration correspondante de l’emploi et du bien être de la population” (section 3.1).

Some passages seem more likely to be read in NGO reports or academic papers than in a major official document: “L’amélioration de la gouvernance demeure un défi majeur pour le pays. Faute d’une volonté politique clairement affirmée pour le changement, la révolution mentale que requiert la situation restera un leurre” (section 4).

Last year’s agricultural law stipulates that only Congolese have the right to own land. Foreigners cannot be majority holders. In section 4.2.4 of Matata’s programme a similar constraint is announced. In the aim of promoting the middle class and protecting small shop-owners, “il est prévu de … interdire l’exercise du petit commerce et des petites activités aux étrangers…”.

Other items seem rather far-fetched in a five-year plan: providing villages with more than 500 inhabitants with wells (section 4.4.1.3), building factories to produce pharmaceuticals (section 4.4.1.6) or investing in the production of silica sands for solar panels (section 4.2.2).

The document is admittedly an outline and doesn’t have the ambition of developing in detail its points. Some ideas do nonetheless require clarification. What does this mean? “establish compulsory public service for people over 18” (section 4.5.2) or “humanize living conditions in prisons and make prisoners productive” (section 4.1.5).

Just days after Matata announced this ambitious programme, the President sent it back to the drawing board. Kabila asked the Prime Minister to rethink the ranking of his priorities because his ‘priority of all priorities’ is establishing security in the east.

From a development perspective, the five-year plan makes sense: implementing it however is going to be an uphill battle.

Matata the academic

Matata Mapon, the new Prime Minister is known as a good technocrat. His major accomplishment as Finance Minister was the debt alleviation package. In July 2010, just days after the 50 year independence celebrations, DRC reached the Completion Point under the HIPC initiative. This meant that $12.3 billion of Congo’s $13.1 billion debt stock was forgiven. Matata was previously a respected manager of the World Bank’s Bureau Central de Coordination (BCECO).

A lesser-known fact about Matata is his academic work. In 1999 he co-signed a really excellent book with François Kabuya Kalala: l’Espace Monétaire Kasaïen: Crise de légitimité et de souveraineté monétaire en période d’hyperinflation au Congo (1993-1997), published by CEDAF/Africa Museum/L'Harmattan. Jean-Claude Masangu Muongo, who was already Governor of the Central Bank, signed the forward.

The book analyzes how the two Kasai provinces refused to use new Zaire notes for over five years, while continuing to use demonetarized notes. The bills were very badly worn and had no legal basis but people believed in them. The creation of this unusual monetary space enabled the Kasais to avoid some of the serious macroeconomic problems that crippled other parts of the country. The book was well-received by Congo economy experts.

For a look at this other dimension of Matata-the-academic, see l’Espace Monétaire Kasaïen.

Chebeya Film Banned in Congo

Censurship is an ugly tactic of dictators.

Thierry Michel’s tragicomic film about the political assassination of human rights activist Floribert Chebeya has been banned in Congo.

After seeing the film, I was amazed that Michel had even been allowed to document the masquerade trail of Chebeya’s murderers.

But after its release in Europe and the US where it won numerous prizes such as the Grand Award at the International Human Rights Film Festival in Paris, Luzolo Bambi (Minister of Justice and Human Rights) formally requested the Congolese National Censorship Commission to ban the film’s distribution and showing. Why? Because certain sequences are allegedly disrespectful to President Kabila.

The trial’s outcome was disappointing. Lower-ranking henchmen were found guilty but the boss and probable godfather of the murder, John Numbi, was not put on trial. General Police Inspector Numbi was Kabila’s security boss from 2007 until his suspension in June 2010 following the international outcry caused by the murder. This native of North Katanga was not sacked but suspended and replaced by the Tutsi general Charles Bisengimana.

Very close to the president, Numbi was the architect of some special operations such as the joint Rwanda-Congo military operation in North Kivu and the bloody repression of the Bundu dia Kongo political religious movement in Bas-Congo. Numbi is too close to the president and knows too much to be put on trail.

The ban is an embarrassment for some European sponsors from France and Belgium that planned on showing the film in their cultural centers in Congo. It even puts into question holding the IOF Francophonie international jamboree in Kinshasa in October this year.

It would be shameful for the IOF to hold such an important summit in Congo until progress in the democratic process has been made.

The assassination of Floribert Chebeya - and Fidele Bazana who is commonly described as his driver but who in fact was a respected colleague of the Voix des Sans Voix leader is a hideous blemish on Joseph Kabila’s record.

It does however prove that some people in Congolese civil society refuse to be intimidated and dare to speak out. Chebeya’s fight, thanks in part to Thierry Michel’s documentary, lives on.

The US National Endowment for Democracy honored Floribert Chebeya posthumously with its Democracy Service Medal. Past awardees include Lech Walesa, Vaclav Havel and the Dalai Lama.

Priorities of Congolese Citizens

'Reach Out to Us: Findings from Focus Groups with Young Men and Women in the DRC' is a timely and informative report produced by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs.

Based on a focus group methodology, the report found that Congolese are primarily concerned about their economic subsistence. They want jobs and security; they are extremely unhappy with the current state of their country and they hold the government responsible for not addressing the country’s woes. People dream of a country where their basic needs are taken care of and where they can live in peace.

The report's findings are hardly surprising. The approach (twelve discussions in six provinces) may even be perceived as naïve, superficial or unrepresentative. Nonetheless, its message and approach are important.

Congo Masquerade repeatedly made the point that reform and development strategies in DRC fail because they are designed and implemented by experts who are disconnected from local reality and ordinary peoples’ perceptions of what needs to be done. Primary beneficiaries – the people- are insufficiently informed, consulted and engaged. State-building strategies are imposed upon them - they are not embedded in their expectations or needs.

By giving voice to the people, this report sends a clear message to Congolese authorities and international partners who now have meaningful political information from the streets and villages of Congo of how people see their future.

Political Maturity in Congo

The obvious news coming out of Congo in the past few months relates to electoral fraud, human rights violations and attempts at forming a government.

Examples of political maturity on the part of ordinary Congolese seem to me, however, to be under-reported. I spent a good part of March in Congo (Kinshasa and Bas-Congo) asking people what they consider to be signs of political maturity.

Informants bitterly reported that authorities (particularly those at the CENI) proved to be brilliant in their ability to cheat and manipulate the electoral process. But there was also a clear sense of awareness, maturity, patience and good judgement on the part of ordinary people. They claim to be informed of what is going on on the political landscape. They are committed to keeping Kabila under scrutiny saying ‘ce Monsieur doit être plus prudent’ and ‘la pression peut affaiblir’.

Despite the huge potential for post-electoral violence, people did not express strongly felt political frustration through violent means. There were incidents but these were relatively limited. Most of the violence that did take place was carried out by the police and military – not by the people.

The discourse of violence also mutated. Heeding the lessons of the Arab Spring, Kinois claim their cell phones (tshombo) are their weapons and text messages bullets. This was a concern to the government which shut down SMS transmission from 3-28 December.

Another example of maturity is voting patterns. Of course we don’t really know who won the presidential vote but the legislative results are truly remarkable. The vast majority of MPs who sat in the previous legislature were not re-elected. They were sanctioned for not delivering on their 2006 promises. They voted themselves $6,000 per month salaries and perks while neglecting social priorities.

People also said that the free tee shirts and tins of sardines that were distributed on the campaign trail were not going to influence their vote as in the past.

Important political figures – even some Ministers (José Endundo - Environment, Alexis Tambwe Mwamba – Foreign Affairs, Martin Kabwelulu - Mining, Raymond Tshibanda - International Cooperation…) were not re-elected. This proves that a well financed campaign is not enough to maintain the trust of a frustrated constituency.

Alphonse Awenza Makiaba, a man with no political experience who feeds his family by transporting bags of rice and manioc on his bicycle, was elected to represent the city of Kisangani at the national level! This candidat des pauvres generated massive popular support precisely because voters could empathize with him.

While ethnicity structures Congolese society, last year’s voting was not always tribal. The election of Désiré Khonde Vila-ki-Kanda is a case in point. Originally from Bas-Congo where he ran and lost in 2006, he now won a seat in the North Kivu city of Goma where voters remembered his accomplishments as Provincial Governor during the Mobutu years.

Dictatorship, war and social stagnation have taught Congolese to be patient. And patience is another sign of political maturity. While some people say that the election fiasco has discouraged them in participating in the voting exercise, others are already gearing up for the next round in 2016.

L'économie politique post-conflit de la RDC

La Section de l’Histoire du Temps Présent du Musée royale de l’Afrique centrale publie la collection Cahiers africains depuis 1993. Spécialisés en matière d’analyse politique, sociale et économique de la RDC, les manuscrits passent par un processus de peer review avant publication.

Nous avons reçu un manuscrit en français sur l’économie politique de la RDC depuis la transition post conflit et cherchons dès lors deux experts pour le peer review. Si ce travail vous intéresse, merci de me contacter : theodore.trefon@africamuseum.be.

Ce travail est non rétribué mais donne droit au choix d’un ouvrage de la collection.

Le volume (de 250 pages) est constitué des chapitres suivants :

1. L’analyse socio-économique de la guerre : Essai de modélisation théorique et évidences empiriques.
2. Transition démocratique et croissance économique.
3. La réhabilitation du système financier en période post-conflit.
4. Les stratégies gouvernementales de sortie de crise : Le programme des 5 Chantiers de la République et la coopération entre le FMI et la RDC.
5. La promotion de l’entrepreneuriat en période post-conflit.
6. Les défis de l’environnement international.
7. Reforme financière et croissance économique : Les dilemmes de la mise en œuvre du DSCRP en RDC.
8. Décentralisation et reforme de la fiscalité en RDC.
9. La dynamique des réseaux d’assurance mutuelle et informelle constitue-t-elle un filet de sécurité en période de conflit ou de post-conflit ?